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PROCEDURE TO TEST TITLE TO PUBLIC OFFICE
IN MARYLAND
Jackson v. Cosby, et al.'

The Mayor of Cambridge filed a bill of complaint seeking an injunction to restrain the defendants from acting as
City Engineer and as City Attorney, respectively. The
bill also sought to restrain the Treasurer and Collector of
Cambridge from paying them their salaries as such officers.
The theory of petitioner's complaint was that no such office
as City Engineer or City Attorney had ever been created
by the charter or ordinances of Cambridge, and that therefore defendants were wrongfully holding office. The plaintiff claimed that this resulted in an infringement upon the
prerogatives of the Mayor, and upon the rights and privileges of the citizens of the town. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the bill, stating that
equity had no jurisdiction in controversies where the questions involved were purely political, and that anyone who
disputes the right of a person to public office must pursue
the remedy allowed by common law.
That courts of equity have no jurisdiction to hear
purely political questions is a well settled doctrine of
equity jurisprudence 2 and one which has been followed on
numerous occasions by the Court of Appeals.' Its application in the present case is undoubtedly correct, since the
Mayor was neither threatened with irreparable injury nor
with a loss of a property right.' The object of the complaint was to try title to a public office, a question purely
political. And it seems well settled in Maryland that the
correct procedure in such cases is by a writ of mandamus.
Because the writ of quo warranto is widely used elsewhere
to try title to public office, 5 the present note will endeavor
to determine first whether it is possible to use quo warranto in any factual set up in Maryland, and secondly, to
122 A. (2d) 453 (Md., 1941).
2 19 Am. Jur. 137, Equity, See. 142; 28 Am. Jur. 267, Injunction, Sec. 72.
' The majority of cases support the view that the incumbent has no property rights in the office he holds. Authority contra is represented by State
v. Prichard, 36 N. J. L. 101 (1873); and Commonwealth v. Slefer, 25 Pa.
St. 23 (1855).
' Hamilton v. Carroll, 82 Md. 326, 33 A. 648 (1896) ; Annapolis v. Gadd,
97 Md. 734, 57 A. 941 (1903) ; Thom v. Cook, 113 Md. 85, 77 A. 120 (1910) ;
Soper v. Jones, 171 Md. 643, 187 A. 833 (1936) ; and Price v. Collins, 122
Md. 109, 89 A. 383 (1918).
I See 51 C. J. 315, Quo Warranto, Sec. 71, n. 2.
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show some of the reasons why the writ has never been employed here.
It is submitted that mandamus and not quo warranto
is the proper procedure in all cases to try title to public
office in Maryland. Many decided cases have made statements as broad as this,6 although possibly they were not
justified in doing so on the basis of their presented facts.
More clearly to delineate, therefore, the factual situations
in which title to public office is in issue, the following four
classifications will be discussed in this note. In the first
place, the plaintiff may be legally holding office, and the
defendant either rightfully or wrongfully claiming it.
Secondly, both the plaintiff and the defendant may have
been election contestants, the defendant winning the contest. Here the plaintiff wishes to oust the defendant from
office, and have himself installed. Thirdly, the plaintiff
may be an officer of the people who sues in their name to
oust the usurper. Fourthly, the plaintiff may be a taxpayer but otherwise uninterested in the office, and the defendant is a usurper.
The first example presented above is illustrated by the
case of Price v. Collins.7 There, plaintiff was a duly commissioned supervisor of elections and had been serving for
some time in that capacity. His term of office had not expired. Defendant had secured an appointment from the
governor for the office which was held by plaintiff. The
Court dismissed plaintiff's bill in equity which sought to
enjoin defendant's efforts to secure the position, and stated
that mandamus was the appropriate remedy in this state
to determine such questions as the record presented. It is
possible to question the case as authority for saying that
quo warranto would not lie, because the question was not
squarely before the Court, namely, whether quo warranto
or mandamus would be the appropriate remedy. It is submitted, however, that the broad general statement to the
effect that mandamus is the correct procedure to determine questions presented by the record, negatives by in6 County Commissioners v. School Commissioners of Washington County,
77 Md. 286, 26 A. 115 (1893) ; Kean v. Rezer, 90 Md. 507, 45 A. 468 (1900) ;
Hummelshime v. Hirsch, 114 Md. 39, 79 A. 38 (1910); West v. Musgrave,
154 Md. 40, 139 A. 551 (1927) ; Richardson v. Blackstone, 135 Md. 530, 109
A. 440 (1919) ; Carey v. Jackson, 165 Md. 472, 169 A. (1933) ; Soper v.
Jones, 171 Md. 643, 187 A. 833 (1936) ; Triesler v. Wilson, 89 Md. 169, 42
Statements as strong also appear in 2 PoE, PLEADING AND
A. 926 (1899).
PaAcTicE (5th Ed., 1925)

673, Sec. 710A; and 2

STATUTES (2nd Ed. 1912) 939, See. 695.
7 122 Md. 109, 89 A. 383 (1913).
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direction the use of any other writ as "the appropriate
procedure". This reasoning is further strengthened by the
fact that quo warranto is normally used to remove one who
holds an office in derogation of the claimant's rights, and
therefore would necessarily be inoperative against one
who was claiming rather than holding the office. 8
The second example presented above is best illustrated
by Harwood v. Marshall? There, plaintiff had been elected
State Librarian, but defendant, the incumbent, refused to
surrender the office. Plaintiff brought a writ of mandamus
to oust defendant, and to have himself installed in the
office. Defendant argued that plaintiff should have proceeded by quo warranto. The Court said that mandamus
would not lie if another remedy was available, but in this
case quo warranto could be no substitute. The reason as
given by the Court was that mandamus was the only procedure which would both oust the usurper and install the
rightful claimant. °
The third example presented above was taken to the
Court of Appeals in Hawkins v. State." There the State's
Attorney sought a quo warranto to oust a County Commissioner from office. The Court recognized that in England
similar officers in the name of the crown possessed the
power to institute quo warranto against incumbents, and
that in America, many jurisdictions gave their State's Attorneys similar powers in the name of the people. But the
Court found that this was not true in Maryland, and that
neither the Attorney General nor the State's Attorney
could institute the writ of quo warranto. 2
The fourth factual possibility, i. e., whether a taxpayer
in his own right could maintain a quo warranto proceeding
against a usurper, has never been squarely before the
Court. In Hummelshime v. Hirsch," however, that question was raised in the reverse order. There, plaintiff, a
1 For a collection of the cases in which quo warranto was used to oust
a usurper see 51 C. J. 309, Quo Warranto, Sees. 1-9.
99 Md. 83 (1856).
10 This reasoning would probably be correct even in jurisdictions that
allow quo warranto in appropriate cases. Quo warranto is brought to
determine by what authority the incumbent holds his office and only can
act, therefore, as a judgment of ouster against defendant. As a result,
plaintiff would still have to proceed by some other writ to have himself
installed in the vacated office.
1181 Md. 306, 57 A. 27 (1895).
12 Apparently the question was left open as to whether the Attorney
General, ex officio, could institute a quo warranto. The Court said the
question was not before it, and that therefore it would not be decided.
13 114 Md. 39, 79 A. 38 (1910).
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taxpayer, petitioned for a mandamus to oust defendant, a
city councilman. Plaintiff had no personal interest in the
office. Defendant pleaded that mandamus was not the
correct procedure, but that plaintiff should have proceeded
by quo warranto. In answering this contention. the Court
said:
"It seems, therefore, that mandamus is not only the
appropriate remedy but that in this state, it is the only
remedy by which one may be removed from an office
to which he is not legally entitled."' 4
It is submitted that this statement is broad enough to enable it to be construed as a declaration on the part of the
Court that had plaintiff attempted to secure relief by quo
warranto, his method of procedure would have been condemned.
Why has quo warranto been universally condemned in
Maryland? The answer is not clear. The solution apparently lies, however, in the stormy history that the writ enjoyed in England. Under the old common law, the writ
of quo warranto was a writ of right for the king, which
could be brought against anyone who wrongfully claimed
an office or franchise. It was used to inquire by what
authority the usurper claimed title to his office, and was
generally regarded as a quasi-criminal proceeding.' 5 Originally, it was brought only by the king's officers. Because
any determination under such a proceeding was conclusive
against the crown, and because of the length of its process,
the common law writ of quo warranto soon fell into general disuse. Its place was taken by the speedier and more
expeditious information in the nature of quo warranto. 16
During the reign of Charles II the information in the
nature of quo warranto was extensively used and abused
by the crown. The kind feared the rise of representative
government, and to combat this "evil" he ordered the surrender of the franchise of many townships by means of the
information. The immediate result was a loss of the town's
representative capacity in the government, and a centralization of the prerogative powers of the king. The ultimate result, however, was a feeling of fear and distrust
"Ibid, 114 Md. 50. Cf. Johnson v. Duke, 24 A. (2d) 304 (Md., 1942),
decided after this note was written.
16 3 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES (Sharswood Edition, 1864), 263.
16 Ibid, 264. Courts use the term quo warranto interchangeably with
the information in the nature of quo warranto. It is evident, however,
that the original common law writ of quo warranto is not used today, nor
was it in use even in the time of Blackstone.
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on the part of the common lawyers with respect to both
quo warranto and the information in the nature of quo
warranto. Consequently, during the reign of Anne, the
writ was made a statutory proceeding by the statute of
9 Anne, C. 20, and subsequently was only to be brought
by leave of the court."7
Undoubtedly, the distrust of any proceeding in the
nature of quo warranto was carried into Maryland practice by the early lawyers here, and it may be safely said
that this was at least one of the reasons for its absence in
Maryland practice. Another possible explanation lies in
the fact that while all of the provisions relating to mandamus, found in 9 Anne, C. 20, were early re-enacted by
the Maryland legislature, 8 none of the provisions pertaining to quo warranto were incorporated into our statutes.
This fact strongly suggests that the quo warranto provisions of 9 Anne were repealed by implication at this early
date.' 9 Moreover, the writ was not set out in any of the
early form books of procedure and practice in Maryland,
and it was argued by counsel in Harwood v. Marshall2
that this fact could only be explained by saying that the
writ did not exist in Maryland.
The reasons for the absence of the writ of quo warranto
in modern Maryland practice can have little more than
purely academic importance. The relief which was once
the province of that writ is amply afforded today by the
writ of mandamus. It cannot be questioned that obtaining the desired relief is the important end to be attained,
and whether the procedure used is called mandamus, quo
warranto, or by any other name is a matter of small moment.
17

The statute is found in 2
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(2nd Ed.

1912) 936.
"sMd. Code (1939) Art. 60, Sees. 1-12.
" This conclusion is strengthened when it is remembered that a special
statutory writ of quo warranto exists in Maryland which is used to forfeit
charters of corporations in appropriate cases. See Md. Code (1939) Art.
23, Sec. 104.
20 9 Md. 83, 95 (1856).

